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VER the past decade of theorizing sexuality it seems that two camps have 0 staked out the bulk of the critical territory. One group of thinkers and 
activists sees sexuality as attacked by scientific discourses, which, often through 
government institutions, exercise control in the form of “bio-power.” The other 
set of critics represents violence against sexuality as a matter of phallic prerog- 
ative gone wild, unrestrained by a passive, accommodating liberal state. To 
render the division more succinctly, one might say there are Michel Foucault and 
Catharine MacKinnon. Whereas Foucault’s central problem is “liberation,” 
MacKinnon’s is subordination. That is, Foucault does a genealogy of scientiu 
sextiulis’s false freedom of confession, while MacKinnon attempts to reveal the 
hidden, but real circumstances of women’s oppression. Foucault plays Nietzsche 
to MacKinnon’s Marx. Foucault says “The emperor is dead.” MacKinnon re- 
sponds, “His sword still cuts, and I wish he would put some clothes on.” A 
betrayed or infinitely deferred “liberation” is not the same as subordination, and 
the response to false liberation must be fundamentally different from that to 
oppression. 
Indeed Foucault and MacKinnon are almost completely at odds, and have 
come to stand for deep divisions among those theorizing sexual politics. On the 
one hand, there are those who seek to escape the “power/knowledge” grip of 
sexual discourse by denying the significance of a sovereign legal authority, and 
by inviting us to play with patriarchy’s symbols in such a way as to denaturalize 
them and thus impede any kind of regulation of sexual practices. On the other 
hand, there are those who insist that radical groups, and then society as a whole, 
must overtly institutionalize a refusal of gender-based oppression, using the state 
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to enforce the right kind of regulations. Thus the former group-sometimes self- 
identified under the vague rubric of “post-modern”-sees the latter group-let’s 
call them “advocate~”~-as naive, accusing them of reconstituting the very au- 
thorities they seek to escape. The advocates rebut the charge by criticizing post- 
modern writers for analyzing away actual oppression and thus refusing their 
own ethical responsibilities for what happens to real people. 
This paper reviews three sodomy cases so as to explore the tensions between 
Foucault and MacKinnon, and attempts an alternative approach to understand- 
ing the relation between politics and sexuality. Specifically, it engages the question 
of how to think about the fact that the recent American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) challenges of sodomy law as unconstitutional have been raised in con- 
texts in which men are accused of raping, assaulting and forcefully sodomizing 
women, and that national lesbian and gay rights organizations have been sup- 
porting those legal challenges (and winning). First, I shall discuss some of the 
particularly salient political issues raised by sodomy laws and their applications. 
I focus on two typical cases that were reviewed by appellate courts, one in which 
the sodomy conviction was upheld, and another in which it was overturned, and 
compare these decisions to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bowers u. Hardwick 
( 1 9 8 6 ) . ~  Second, I summarize the broader contours of the problem: what are the 
bases of alliances and antagonisms between gays, lesbians and women?4 Third, 
I will provide overviews of Foucault’s and MacKinnon’s analyses of gender/ 
power relations, showing both where they are useful and inadequate for helping 
us understand these cases. In particular I discuss the centrality of Christian 
evangelicalism: which both theorists avoid, in shaping the discourse of contem- 
porary sexual politics in the United States. The appropriate response to these 
religious representations, I argue, is not to deny the will to truth, or to displace 
the phallus, as Foucault and MacKinnon would have it, but-and here I follow 
Gayatri Spivak-to affirm the desire( s) of women and lesbiam6 
2 “Advocate” is from the Latin advocare, which means “to summon.” The first entry in Webster’s 
defines an advocate as “one that pleads the cause of another before a tribunal or juridical court,” 
and “one that defends or maintains a cause or proposal.” Such definitions capture the characteristics 
of those who seek to overturn conventional practices by arguments that appeal to the authority of 
the state, and who assert genuine differences between their views and those of others. 
478 U.S. 191 (1986). 
Since sexuality is a construct of gender (and vice versa) and both derive from culture, not biology, 
‘‘lesbian,’’ for instance, is not a sub-category of “woman,” but an identity sui generis. (For more on 
the distinction between “woman” and “lesbian” cf. Monique Wittig, “The Straight Mind,” Feminist 
Issues, Vol. I, no. I, Summer 1980.) 
I am following James Davison Hunter’s definition of “evangelicalism,” which he says is the 
“North American expression of theologically conservative Protestantism . . . Fundamentalism is 
viewed here as a faction within Evangelicalism and not as a movement distinct from Evangelicalism.” 
Evangelicalism: The Coming Generation, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 
PP; 2-4. 
Displacement and the Discourse of Woman,” in Displacement: Derrida and After, ed. Mark 
Krupnick (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983). 
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I. SODOMY LAWS 
I. 
To anybody concerned with challenging prevailing gendedpower relations sod- 
omy laws seem like they are nothing if not bad news, in nothing if not obvious 
ways. There is Michael Hardwick, for instance, a courageous gay man arrested 
in his bedroom for having oral sex, who has come to symbolize the precarious 
legal status of all lesbians and gays in the United States. Twenty-four states and 
the District of Columbia still have laws that make it criminal for people of the 
same sex to make love in particular ways, and there is something, if not uncon- 
stitutional, then at least clearly immoral and repulsive about such legislation. 
There are also Orrin Hatch and Jesse Helms. Michael Hardwick versus Jesse 
Helms. I t  doesn’t seem as though there is much to think about. Except that 
“[Clonsenting adults are generally not prosecuted for nonpublic violations of 
sodomy statutes.”’ The vast majority of sodomy charges and convictions are in 
circumstances in which men are accused of “aggravated sodomy” involving a 
woman, and convicted of ‘‘sodomy.”8 
Prosecutors or juries use sodomy statutes as a sort of half-way punishment of 
these defendankg Georgia and Oklahoma appellate court decisions, both prior 
to and following the United States Supreme Court Bowers decision, reveal this 
pattern quite clearly, with men being charged with rape and/or forcible sodomy, 
and being convicted of sodomy. Where, as in Oklahoma, even consensual sodomy 
is illegal, juries can send men to jail even when they are not convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the men used force, that the women involved did not 
consent. It is always the men, and not the women, who are charged with sodomy 
in these cases. (Sodomy laws are also often the only recourse available for 
prosecuting homosexual rape cases.)1° Before proceeding I want to be quite 
explicit about my motives for pursuing the few apparently salutary effects of 
sodomy laws: they are a proxy for one version of what it looks like when the 
’ “Developments in the law: sexual orientation and the law,” Harvard Law Review, v. 102, (May, 
8 ibid. 
19891, P. ISZO.  
ibid. Curiously, later this essay states that sodomy laws are applied disproportionately against 
gays. The single source to which this and other authors who make this point refer is U.S. v. Does, 
D.C. Superior Court, 1973, in which the court decided that “discriminatory application of D.C. 
Code Sec. 22-3 502 against homosexuals may present a selective enforcement problem of constitu- 
tional dimensions, Yick Wo . . .” In this case the court construed the sodomy statute to be consti- 
tutional only when applied to nonconsensual sodomy, or sodomy with children. However, recent 
constitutional challenges on these grounds were dismissed in Ray v. State, 389 S.E.zd 326 (Ga. 
1990). In Ray the appellant contended that the Missouri sodomy law “violates his right to equal 
protection under the United States Constitution because, he alleges, the statute is selectively enforced 
only against homosexuals.” The majority opinion of Georgia’s Supreme Court continues, “We find 
no merit in this contention, as there is no evidence in the record that [the statute] is selectively 
enforced” (327) .  
10 ibid., p. 1520. 
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state punishes men for sexual crimes against women without interrogating either 
the intent of the man or the consent of the woman, which is by no means to 
argue that there is anything that is intrinsically good about sodomy laws. Indeed, 
as we shall see, even in cases in which sodomy laws lead to the punishment of 
men for violence, the laws also efface women’s identities and selfhood in pro- 
found ways. 
11. 
A sodomy charge shifts the focus away from women’s consent and puts it on 
whether “something happened.” Such a scenario overcomes the difficulties of 
punishing men for rape when we live in a rape culture. As MacKinnon puts it 
men who are in prison for rape think it’s the dumbest thing that ever happened. 
. . . It  isn’t just a miscarriage of justice; they were put in jail for something very 
little different from what most men do most of the time and call it sex. The only 
difference is that they got caught. . . Now this gets us into intense trouble, because 
that’s exactly how judges and juries see it who refuse to convict men accused of 
rape. A rape victim has to prove that it was not intercourse. She has to show that 
there was force and she resisted, because if there was sex, consent is inferred.” 
A survivor of forced sodomy doesn’t have to prove that it was “not sodomy” 
the way a victim of rape has to prove it was “not intercourse.” In other words, 
sodomy laws appear to be a Catharine MacKinnon dream come true. Men are 
charged and convicted, if not of rape, then at least of something. Again, my 
point is not that sodomy laws are good things, but they do have the concrete 
effect of punishing some rapists who might otherwise go free. That state inter- 
vention achieves this apparent benefit for some women at the expense of gays 
and lesbians needs to be investigated.I2 
111. 
What follows is from the majority opinion of the Georgia State Supreme 
Court in Stover v. State. 
The evidence was in sharp conflict regarding the circumstances immediately sur- 
rounding the alleged sexual acts, but there was general agreement as to the events 
leading up to those acts. Stover and two male companions were riding about in a 
pick-up truck in the late afternoon or early evening hours. They happened upon 
’1 Feminism Unmodified, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 88. 
12 A coalition of women’s groups and gay and lesbian organizations in Washington, D.C. had 
been working with the city to rewrite the laws on sex crimes beginning in the late 1980s. The 
coalition broke up in the spring, 1991 after the district attorney told women working for various 
anti-rape organizations that the elimination of sodomy laws, which the gay and lesbian organizations 
had been advocating, would make it more difficult to convict men charged with rape. (Christine 
Spaulding, a Washington, D.C. attorney involved in these negotiations, informed me of these events.) 
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Holly Marie Capes who was walking beside the roadway and gave her a ride. The 
foursome spent the next several hours riding around together drinking beer and 
visiting here and there. Eventually they drove down a dirt road into a wooded area 
and stopped. It  was about 10:30 p.m. Capes’ testimony was that Stover forced her 
to commit acts of oral sodomy upon him and to have sexual intercourse with him 
on the open bed of the truck while one of his companions remained in the vicinity. 
Stover testified these acts were willingly done on his promise to pay money later.I3 
Stover was indicted for rape and aggravated sodomy. He was convicted of 
sodomy as a lesser included offense of aggravated sodomy, and sentenced to  five 
years probation. He appealed his conviction on two grounds. First, that the 
statute was “unconstitutional for violation of the right of privacy guaranteed by 
the constitutions of the United States and Georgia.”l4 Second, Stover claimed 
that sodomy is not a lesser included offense of aggravated sodomy, since “for- 
nication is not a lesser included offense of rape.”ls 
The court dismissed the first contention, noting that sex in a truck with 
someone nearby is a “public act,” so that “Whatever the constitutional privacy 
rights may be of one who engages in sodomy in private places they do not attach 
to another doing the same in public.”*6 The court dismissed the second challenge 
on the grounds that while consent does matter for the distinction between 
fornication and rape, consent is not at  stake in the prohibitions against sodomy. 
[Alggravated sodomy is an act of simply sodomy plus the additional element: force 
and against the will of someone . . . The court in Speer held fornication is not a 
lesser included offense of rape since the offenses have directly opposite characters. 
But here, where the legislature has intertwined the definitions of sodomy and 
aggravated sodomy, basing one on the express inclusion of the other, we decline to 
extend the Speer rationale.” 
Thus two legal principles against which sexual libertarians have been fighting- 
narrow interpretations of what counts as private, and prohibitions against non- 
procreative sex-seem to have served a feminist cause, i.e. convicting a man of 
a sex crime against a woman. If not for the restricted definition of what counts 
as “private” (basically, only one’s bedroom, not the back of one’s truck) and the 
prohibitions against sodomy, James Stover Jr would have had his ambition to 
have unlimited access to women’s bodies affirmed rather than penalized, however 
slightly. 
l3 3 5 0  S.E.rd (Ga. 1986). The Georgia sodomy statute reads: “A person commits the offense of 
sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and 
the mouth or anus of another. A person commits the offense of aggravated sodomy when he commits 
sodomy with force and against the will of the other person.” (Stover, at 578.) 
l4 Stover, at 578. 
Is Stover, at 579. 
l6 Stover, at 578. 
l7 Stover, at 579. 
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In Post v. State the circumstances of the crime were similar, but the legal 
results were quite different. Lester Post Jr  was charged with Rape, two  counts 
of the Crime Against Nature, and  Maiming, After Former Conviction of a 
Felony.’* As in the Stover case, the plaintiff’s and  defendant’s accounts of the 
events leading up  to the crime were ~ imi1a r . l~  
H.C. went to the Red Eye Saloon in Claremore, Oklahoma on the morning of 
January 7, 1983. While at the saloon, she met the appellant, who invited her to his 
house to watch television and drink beer. H.C. accepted the appellant’s invitation.20 
At this point the stories diverge. 
When they arrived at the house, the appellant allegedly demanded sex. H.C. claimed 
she was forced, at knife-point, to have sex with the appellant. She also claimed 
appellant anally sodomized her and forced her to commit an act of fellatio. As 
appellant sexually assaulted her, he also repeatedly beat her and caused a severe 
injury to her eye, according to H.C.’s testimony. Finally, the appellant allowed H.C. 
to dress, and they left the house together. H.C. and the appellant eventually sepa- 
rated, and H.C. went to a friend’s house and called her husband. 
Dr. Raymond Townsend, an ophthalmologist, testified H.C. was blinded in the 
eye, which eventually was surgically removed . . . A forensic chemist testified that 
swabs taken during a rape examination of H.C. indicated the presence of sperm in 
the rectum.21 
Post offered a different version of the events. 
He claimed all of the sexual acts, including anal intercourse and oral copulation, 
were voluntarily performed by H.C. After completing these sex acts, the appellant 
fell asleep. He awoke suddenly when he discovered H.C. going through his pants 
pockets. Appellant testified he believed H.C. was attempting to steal his money, 
and he struck her in anger several times, though he did not intend to injure her. 
He and H.C. then dressed and left the house together. After walking several blocks 
together, H.C. asked that appellant not accompany her any further, as she would 
not be able to explain his presence to her husband.2z 
At the very least we  have a married woman who meets a man a t  the Red Eye 
Saloon and  is blinded as a result of a sexual encounter with a ‘Post’ who is his 
father, i.e., Lester Post, J .  That’s all a bit too overdetermined to pursue. But 
what about the man  who fears his wallet is being stolen ou t  of his pants after 
having anal intercourse? Presumably the wallet is kept in his back pocket, so 
that, in his version, Post is the victim, and  H.C. the aggressor. H e  was simply 
protecting his assets against H.C., and  the state had no business intervening in 
I *  Post u. State 715 P.rd 1105. 
I 9  According to the Oklahoma State Supreme Court, “the Crime Against Nature includes unnatural 
sex acts including copulation pre os [oral sex] between females, cunnilingus, fellatio, and rectal 
coitus (copulation per anus),” Post, at I 106-7. 
Post at 1106. 
2 l  ibid. 
22 ibid. 
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this private matter. Post, not H.C., experiences the anal violence, or at least 
that’s the story the appellate court accepts. 
The Court decided that since the “Crime Against Nature” prohibits consen- 
sual, as well as nonconsensual, “acts of unnatural copulation” the law uncon- 
stitutionally violated Post’s privacy. Inferring that the rape acquittal meant that 
no force was involved in the sodomy, the Court overturned Post’s sodomy 
conviction, and reduced the Maiming conviction to an assault conviction, on the 
grounds that Post did not intend to cause a permanent injury (but simply to 
protect his wallet). Interestingly, the Court’s decision in Post reads like Laurence 
Tribe’s Supreme Court brief on behalf of Hardwick in Hardwick v. Bowers 
(1986). Both the Oklahoma Court and Tribe root their arguments against con- 
sensual sodomy laws in the “modern judicial conception of constitutional privacy 
[that] originated in Griswold v. Connecticut,” where “the Supreme Court found 
the existence of an implicit constitutional right of privacy in the ‘penumbras’ of 
various constitutional p r ~ v i s i o n s . ” ~ ~  Using the same argument that Tribe was to 
use unsuccessfully just months later, the Oklahoma Supreme Court opined that 
“It now appears to us that the right to privacy, as formulated by the Supreme 
Court, includes the right to select consensual adult sex partners.”24 The Okla- 
homa Supreme Court also drew the same inferences as Tribe from the Stanley 
decision-which states that the First Amendment protects the right of individuals 
to view pornography in the privacy of their homes-holding that the Supreme 
Court “obviously did not deal with protective choice within or without marriage, 
but instead extended the right of privacy to matters of sexual gratifi~ation.”~’ In
its essentials the Oklahoma Criminal Appellate Court’s opinion reads like an 
ACLU brief. 
We recognize it is the opinion of many that abnormal sexual acts, even those 
involving consenting adults, are morally reprehensible. However, this natural re- 
pugnance does not create a compelling justification for state regulation of these 
activities. The Supreme Court has determined that merely because the purchase and 
use of contraceptives by unmarried persons would arouse moral indignation among 
broad segments of the community, or that the use of pornographic materials in the 
privacy of one’s home would invoke general displeasure, does not provide a com- 
pelling justification to regulate either activity.26 
Yet we need to keep in mind the actual circumstances of the decision: a man 
who was accused of rape and aggravated sodomy, and who punched out a 
woman’s eye. In Bowers v. Hardwick, as we shall see below, the United States 
23 Post, at 1107. 
z4 Post, at 1109. 
25 ibid., referring to Stanley u. Georgia 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In Stanley the Supreme Court held 
that “the individual’s right to view obscene material in the privacy of his or her home could not be 
regulated by the state.” 
26 ibid. 
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Supreme Court rejected the relevance of the reproductive choice decisions and 
Stanley. And yet, two months after Bowers, it let stand the Post decision, by 
refusing to hear the State’s appeal. Although the above excerpt from Post runs 
directly counter to the majority opinion in Bowers, the fact that the Post decision 
explicitly stated “We do not reach the question of horno~exual i ty ,”~~ may have 
allowed the Supreme Court to convince themselves that the two opinions were 
not at  odds. 
In Bowers v. Hardwick the Court rejected Hardwick’s argument that sodomy 
was protected by a constitutional right to privacy. Whereas the Oklahoma Su- 
preme Court found that the procreative choice precedents spoke to the issue of 
consensual sex, the United States Supreme Court held that Griswold and Eisen- 
studt were really about protecting the privacy of families and heterosexual sex. 
Accepting the decisions in [Griswold, Eisenstudt, and Roe v. Wade] . . . we think 
it evident that none of the rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance 
to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that 
is asserted in this case. No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on 
the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated . . .2* 
At the same time, the Court noted that “Proscriptions against [consensual hom- 
osexual sodomy] have ancient roots” and that 24 states and the District of 
Columbia have laws against sodomy.29 In its Bowers decision the majority in- 
terpreted Stanley to be primarily about First Amendment protections of what 
gets read in the home-about words, not acts.30 Thus, the opinion concluded 
that there were no precedents for viewing sodomy as a fundamental right, and 
therefore no grounds for overturning the Georgia law. In Stover, sodomy laws 
are used to convict a man of sexual violence against a woman; in Post sodomy 
laws are ruled unconstitutional, and thus a man is not punished for sexual 
violence against a woman; and in Bowers, sodomy laws are upheld, and a man 
is punished for having consensual sex with another man. All three decisions were 
written in 1986, and there have been few changes in state laws or court inter- 
pretations and applications of sodomy laws since then.31 
Before proceeding it is important to note that sodomy laws and their appli- 
cation are not some deviant quirk in the otherwise seamless social fabric of 
misogyny. It is not aberrant that men are punished for forced anal and oral sex, 
27 ibid. 
28 Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 191 (1986), citing Griswold v. Connecticut 3 8 1  U.S. 479 (1965); 
29 Bowers, at 193-4. 
30 The Supreme Court decision in Stanley held that “the individual’s right to view obscene material 
in the privacy of his or her home could not be regulated by the state.” Quoted in Post at 109. 
31 The fact that the vote was 5-4, and that after he retired Justice Powell wrote an opinion piece 
for the New York Times stating he regretted his swing vote for the majority, may prove of interest 
to those fascinated by counter-factual speculations. However, because Bowers was heard relatively 
recently and the Court is dominated by Reagan-Bush appointees, there is little reason to believe a 
similar case will be heard, much less resolved differently, in the near future. 
Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
LEVITICUS IN AMERICA 1 1 3  
while they are not punished for forced vaginal intercourse. Sodomy laws have 
their historical roots, as Justice White was kind enough to remind us, in the 
Bible. During the reign of Henry VIII, Leviticus was interpreted to mandate 
prohibitions against sex that did not lead to procreation, specifically, prohibitions 
against “spilling seed.” Jeffrey Weeks writes, 
Authoritative theologians argued that acts of sodomy were the gravest of sins 
because, by definition, they could not lead to procreation, whereas fornication, 
seduction, rape or incest could.32 
Indeed Justice Burger used this historical evidence as grounds for his concurring 
opinion, citing Blackstone’s description of “‘the infamous crime against nature’ 
as an offense of ‘deeper malignity’ than rape, an heinous act ‘the very mention 
of which is disgrace to human nature,’ and ‘a crime not fit to be named.’”33 
Sodomy was (is!) believed to be worse than rape, according to Weeks, because 
the idea that women’s uteruses are passive receptacles for male semen somehow 
naturalized, normalized any version of men’s appropriation of women’s vaginas, 
but called into question men’s efforts in other regions of the female body. Such 
a view of women is also consistent with the legal inattention to sex between 
women. Many countries in Europe formally prohibited only sex between men 
(although women thought to have sex with other women were sometimes pun- 
ished under laws against witches-sex between women apparently being too 
unnameable even to count as “unnameable”). Juries also may be more likely to 
convict men for sodomy than for rape because there is the implicit belief that 
while women might mean “yes” when they say “no” in rape cases, our culture’s 
denial of the existence, much less the complexity,’ of women’s sexual desires 
means that juries have a hard time believing that women might enjoy sex that 
goes beyond the realm of traditional heterosexual, procreative i n t e r c o ~ r s e . ~ ~  In 
support of this conjecture is the fact that women are virtually never charged for 
sodomy, even though sodomy laws state that both consenting adults are violating 
the statute. If there were a general impression that men and women were equally 
desirous of non-procreative sex, we might expect to see both men and women 
charged with sodomy crimes. 
These sodomy cases seem to represent quintessential instances of differences 
between Foucault and MacKinnon. On one hand, leaving these laws on the 
books clearly punishes gays and lesbians; on the other hand, removing them- 
reducing some of the state’s policing of sexuality-would remove some state 
protections of women. And yet this all sounds quite odd, as if there must be 
something wrong with how I am representing the two sides, since the dominant 
32 Sex, Politics, and Society: The Regulation of Sexuality since 1800,  (London, New York: Long- 
) 3  Bowers at 197, emphasis in original. 
34 Jenny Terry suggested this to me. 
man, 19891, P. 4. 
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radical narratives of sexual politics emphasize the common sources of homo- 
phobia and misogyny, and thus seem to point to a political common ground 
among homosexuals and women. 
IV. 
The prevalent view among progressive critics who write about sex and politics 
is that gender and sexuality are two sides of the same coin, while the oppression 
of women and gays is how that coin gets spent.3s Much of the recent work 
elaborating on the conditions by which this exchange constitutes both sexuality 
and gender draws on Gayle Rubin’s essay “The Traffic in Women,” in which 
she revisits Levi-Strauss’s research on kinship. Rubin’s thesis is that clear de- 
marcations between what is masculine and what is feminine constitute the au- 
thority of men who marry, thereby oppressing both men who do not participate 
in traditional kinship structures, as well as all women. 
The suppression of the homosexual component of human sexuality, and by corol- 
lary, the oppression of homosexuals, is therefore the product of the same system 
whose rules and relations oppress women.36 
Drawing on Rubin, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick states, “[H]omophobia directed by 
men against men is misogynistic, perhaps transhistorically Although Rubin 
discusses the doubly destabilizing consequences of female homosexuality for 
traditional kinship networks, which will be considered later in this essay, Sedg- 
wick chooses to ignore this aspect of Rubin’s work. Notably absent from Sedg- 
wick’s economy are lesbians, by now the visibly invisible. Sedgwick attempts to 
justify her silence on grounds that women do not direct much homophobia 
against women, and thus there is no distinctive category “lesbian” that stands 
opposed to “woman,” whereas there are clear fissures between “homosexual” 
and “man.” 
[Tlhe diacritical opposition between the ‘homosocial’ and the ‘homosexual’ seems 
to be much less thorough and dichotomous for women, in our society, than for 
35 For examples from across a good part of the gender identity spectrum, cf.: Jill Johnston, Lesbian 
Nation: The Feminist Solution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 19731, p. 183; Catharine Mac- 
Kinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 
1989), p. 111; Mario Mieli, Homosexuality and Liberation: Elements of a Gay Critique, tr. David 
Fernbach (London: Gay Men’s Press, 1980), pp. 35, 46; Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: 
Notes Toward a Political-Economy of Sex,” in Toward an Anthropology of Women, Rayna Reiter, 
ed. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 197s); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men: English 
Literature and Male Homosocial Desire (New York: Columbia University Press, 198 5 ) ;  Simon 
Shepherd and Mick Wallis, Coming On Strong (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989) introduction, pp. 14, 
19. Barbara Smith, Home Girls (New York: Kitchen Table Press, 1983), introduction. 
36 “Traffic,” p. 180. 
37 Between Men, p. 20. Sedgwick wisely qualifies her use of the term “homophobic,” stating that 
“heterosexism” would be more “suggestive of collective, structurally inscribed, perhaps materially 
based oppression” (footnote, p. 219). 
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men. At this particular historical moment, an intelligible continuum of aims, emo- 
tions, and valuations links lesbians with the other forms of women’s attention to 
women . . . it seems to make sense to say that women in our society who love 
women, women who teach, study, nurture, suckle, write about, march for, vote for, 
give jobs to, or otherwise promote the interests of other women, are pursuing 
congruent and closely related ac t iv i t i e~ .~~  
In the Sedgwickian economy there are only heterosexual men, homosexual men, 
and women. Although Sedgwick does not make a transhistorical claim for her 
representations of their relations, the “our society” qualification is rather disin- 
genuous, since nowhere in the rest of the book does she show us moments at  
which sexuality is the site of divisions between women. Thus, according to 
Sedgwick, homophobia directed against gays also structures misogyny, and to 
fight that homophobia is to fight misogyny. (Sedgwick never cares to formulate 
the struggle in reciprocal terms.) Gays and women are comrades and sisters in 
struggle against a common oppressive gender system. 
The common ground of lesbians, gays and women, however, at  times is 
political quicksand, as anyone who has spent more than 20 seconds at  a political 
meeting or  academic conference organized around the themes of either feminism 
or homosexuality knows, meaning that Sedgwick‘s vision of trouble-free coali- 
tions is utter nonsense. Women in 12-step incest recovery programs tell the 
leather dykes to take off the cock straps; the clones tell the queens to go back 
in the closet; minor posses are organized among some gays, lesbians, and other 
feminists in order to rid the community of Catharine MacKinnon. By comparing 
Foucault’s and MacKinnon’s views of sodomy politics I hope to shed some light 
on these antagonisms. 
V. 
As mentioned above, one might read Foucault’s central problem, what he is 
most concerned with overcoming, as “sexual liberation”-a phrase for which 
the consistent quotation marks in Foucault’s texts marks his argument that “it” 
doesn’t exist, and pursuing “it” renders it even more distant. “Sexual liberation, 
Foucault claims,” according to Atar Hussein, “is an illusory horizon created by 
a mistaken view of power which comes to bear on ~ e x u a l i t y . ” ~ ~  Foucault believes 
that the problem with contemporary social thought is that it is stuck in the 
seventeenth century. “[Tlhe representation of power has remained under the spell 
of monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head 
of the king,” despite evidence that the sovereign, the law, is irrelevant to power 
relations in our daily lives. 
38 Sedgwick, pp. 2-3. 
39 ‘‘Foucault’s History of Sexuality,” mlk 1981, 5 & 6, p. 169. 
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We have been engaged for centuries in a type of society in which the juridical is 
increasingly incapable of coding power, or serving as its system of representation. 
Our historical gradient carries us further and further away from a reign of law that 
had already begun to recede into the past at a time when the French Revolution 
and the accompanying age of constitutions and codes seemed to destine it for a 
future that was at hand.40 
Foucault’s history of sodomy discourses from the 16th to the 20th century is 
thus a genealogy of the shift from the power/knowledge nexus of religion and 
the state to that of psychology. 
Consider for example the history of what was once ‘the’ great sin against nature. 
The extreme discretion of the texts dealing with sodomy-that utterly confused 
category-and the nearly universal reticence in talking about it made possible a 
two-fold ~ p e r a t i o n . ~ ~  
Foucault goes on to contrast this two-fold operation-the severity of punishment 
and widespread tolerance of sodomy as a religious/juridical violation through 
the eighteenth century-with the “appearance in the nineteenth century” of “a 
whole series of discourses on the species and subspecies of homosexuality, in- 
version, pederasty, and ‘psychic hermaphrodism’ [that] made possible a strong 
advance of social controls into this area of ‘per~ersi ty .”’~~ The religious/juridical 
prohibitions against sodomy transformed into the medical community’s regula- 
tion of homosexuals. 
What Foucault outlines here is a profound shift-as opposed to a continuous 
progression-from what “sodomy” looked like in its religious/juridical represen- 
tations to the appearance of “homosexuality” in the discourses of nineteenth 
century medicine and science. The same nineteenth century that brought us 
discourses on the subspecies of homosexuality . . . made possible a strong advance 
of social controls into this area of ‘perversity’; but it also made possible the 
formation of a ‘reverse’ discourse: homosexuality began to speak on its own be- 
half . . .43 
The problem with such a ‘reverse’ response, deeply determined by the medical- 
scientific discourse of sexuality out of which it emerges, is that it cannot help 
but legitimate the regulatory practices against which it seems to argue. In re- 
sponse to the question “Who or what is it that co-ordinates the activities of 
agents of the political body? ” Foucault states, “Naturally it’s medicine which 
has played the basic role as the common d e n ~ m i n a t o r . ” ~ ~  And the more we talk 
about sex, regardless of what is said, the more the medical-scientific discourse- 
4n History of Sexuality, volume I, Robert Hurley, tr. (New York: Vintage Books, 1980). p. 89. 
41 ibid., p. 101. 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid. 
44 PowerlKnowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77, tr. Colin Gordon, Leo 
Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper. Colin Gordon (ed.) (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 62. 
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which derives its authority from representations of sexuality-accrues and de- 
ploys its power. In his final sentence of The History of Sexuality, v.1, after 
pondering the significance of the modern psychoanalytic obsession with sex, 
Foucault writes, “The irony of this deployment is in having us believe that our 
‘liberation’ is in the balance.”45 Foucault implies that homosexuals ought not to 
seek sexual liberation, since it does not exist, while the modern confessional 
discourse that effort implies only reinscribes the legitimacy of concepts such as 
“pathology.” Thus Foucault observes that the women’s movements are more 
inventive,” and pose more of a challenge to the prevailing sexual discourse than 
homosexual politics because “the homosexual liberation movements remain very 
much caught at the level of demands for the right to their sexuality, the dimension 
of the sexological,” which only reiterates the discourse of sexual regulation. 
“Women on the other hand are able to have much wider economic, political and 
other kinds of  objective^."^^ 
( L  ’ 
VI . 
The linchpin of MacKinnon’s work is sexual violence against women, which 
she believes is at  the root of women’s oppression. MacKinnon is not concerned, 
at the initial level of her analysis a t  least, with the stifling or  manufactured nature 
of women’s desire. Feminism, for her, is not about false freedoms, but about 
actual suffering. To put it bluntly, “[Fleminism finds women oppressed as a sex 
. . .”47 For MacKinnon (like Foucault) what happens in the name of sex represents 
a host of imbricated gendedpower relations of what for MacKinnon (unlike 
Foucault) is most significantly women’s subordination. “A systematic inequality 
between the sexes” writes MacKinnon, “exists in the social practice of sexual 
violence, subjection to which defines women’s status . . .”48 Although rape, 
perhaps the most central embodiment of this oppression for MacKinnon, does 
not have the quotation mark status of Foucault’s “liberation,” MacKinnon’s 
definition of the practice suggests some of the paradoxes of Foucauldian “lib- 
eration.” Just as Foucault understands the dominant discourse as categorizing, 
cajoling, producing a desire for LLliberation,’y and thereby causing one to question 
a simple rebuttal against homophobic discursive practices, MacKinnon too notes 
the continuity between what looks oppressive (rape) and what looks 0.k. (inter- 
course), but also looks like rape. In other words, both theorists see the dominant 
set of power/knowledge relations as totalizing, even as Foucault resists a total- 
izing theory of this state of affairs. So whereas both Foucault and MacKinnon 
describe power in rather totalizing ways, the effects of that power that most 
45 History, p. 159.  
46 PowerlKnowledge, p. 220. 
47 Toward a Feminist Theory, p. 69. 
48 ibid., p. 245. 
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interest Foucault are those he notes in the phenomenon of “liberation,” while 
for MacKinnon power is what keeps women down. 
VII. 
Foucault’s project is to explain domination and subordination at the margins, 
“not the domination of the King in his central position, therefore, but that of 
his subjects in their mutual  relation^."^^ His analysis is concerned with “the 
point where power surmounts the rules of right,” and thus he believes “one 
should try to locate power at the extreme points in its exercise, where it is always 
less legal in its character.”s0 Although it appears that Foucault does not have 
much to say about contemporary sodomy laws and court decisions per se (since 
they are juridical and thus seem to refer to a center), legal documents cannot be 
cleanly separated from the larger political culture in which they are written. Just 
because power has non-juridical forms at the margins does not mean that we 
can ignore its juridical expressions. So how would Foucault explain these deci- 
sions? 
In this section I try to give the best gloss possible on Foucauldian interpreta- 
tions of the three sodomy cases. These readings, however, sound thin, in large 
part because Foucault’s work, as will be explained in more detail later, is not all 
that relevant for understanding legal discourses in the United States. As Carol 
Smart has pointed out, in the United States the courts still exercise their authority 
in the name of rights, and not in the language of what she calls the ‘psy’ 
professions. For instance, in the matter of parental access to children after a 
divorce the courts no longer make decisions based on parental rights, and to a 
certain extent adopt the ‘psy’ professions’ argument that decisions should be 
made that are in the best interests of the children. And yet this privileging of the 
children’s interests over those of the parents is still couched in a language of 
rights. 
Hence the law argues that access is the inalienable right of the child. Once defined 
as a right the law can deploy its traditional powers to defend this right (even to 
the extent of obliging a child to exercise hisiher rights against his or her will). This 
transformation of power conflicts into the language of rights enables law to exercise 
power rather than abdicating control to the ‘psy’ professions and the mechanisms 
of 
Since what goes in as psychology still comes out as liberal ideology, Foucault’s 
work is problematic for social analyses in the United States. 
-19 PowerlKnowledge, p. 96. 
50 ibid. 
5 1  Feminism and the Power of Law (New York, London: Routledge, 1989), p. 20, emphasis in 
original. 
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Foucault would most likely say that the Stover case, in which the appellate 
court upheld the sodomy conviction in the backwoods of Georgia, was an 
instance reminiscent of the communal interest which Foucault describes in the 
sexual encounter between a Lourrainese peasant half-wit and a “little girl” in 
1 8 6 7 . ~ ~  Like the peasant, Jouy, whose sporadic sexual encounters with a young 
girl (in exchange for a few coins) were punished by local authorities, the local 
Georgia police could be said to have intervened in what was also a case of sex 
undertaken on the basis of an allegedly consensual exchange. The view of sex 
in a flatbed truck as being “public” could be understood as similar to the 
community’s regulation of the extramarital sex in the barn in rural France, a 
predictable symptom of a sexually regulatory government which Foucault would 
attack. 
Foucault no doubt would approve of the Post decision. He might explain the 
Oklahoma appellate court decision as one indication of the liberal state’s ten- 
dencies to withdraw from the overt regulation of sexuality. At the same time, 
Foucault might point to the court’s refusal to extend privacy protections to 
homosexual sex. That the opinion was justified on the basis of a series of Supreme 
Court decisions about the need for the state to respect marital privacy is consis- 
tent with Foucault’s observation that the state has given up on controlling sex 
in the family through the criminal code, and now leaves the sexual disciplining 
of the family to other (medical) authorities-many of whom may be employed 
by the state through its social welfare agencies, but play the role of confessor, 
not police. 
Ironically, it is a homosexual sodomy decision, an obvious testing ground for 
a Foucauldian analysis, where Foucault’s work reveals its most glaring shortcom- 
ings. Foucault might make much of the fact that both Michael Bowers (the 
Georgia Attorney General) and Laurence Tribe (Hardwick’s lawyer), refer to 
medical literatures to support their respective contentions. For instance, Bowers 
states that male homosexuality leads to AIDS and hepatitis, and cites a social 
science article that connects homosexuality with “social disorder.’’ Bowers claims 
that 
it should be permissible for the General Assembly to find as legislative fact that 
homosexual sodomy leads to other deviate practices such as sado-masochism, group 
orgies, or transvestism, to name only a few . . . Similarly, the legislature should be 
permitted to draw conclusions concerning the relationship of homosexual sodomy 
in the transmission of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and other 
diseases such as anorectal gonorrhea, Hepatitis A, Hepatitis B, enteric protozoal 
diseases, and Cytomegalovirus, and the concomitant effects of this relationship on 
the general public health and welfare.j3 
s2 History of Sexuality V. I, p. 3 1-2. 
53 Brief of Petitioner Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, December 19, 1985. No. 
85-1407 PP. 36-7. 
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Meanwhile, Tribe mentions that “the nation’s major scientific and professional 
associations . . . have officially declared their opposition to state regulation of 
private adult conduct by force of criminal s a n ~ t i o n . ” ~ ~  For the most part, how- 
ever, such references appear almost as afterthoughts, as tangential evidence that 
does not hurt either side’s case, but not the stuff on which either Bowers or 
Tribe hang their cases. Rather, the Attorney General includes frequent references 
to historical norms of “immorality” and cites several passages from the Bible. 
For instance, 
No universal principle of morality teaches that homosexual sodomy is acceptable 
conduct. To the contrary, traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe such conduct. 
Indeed, there is no validation for sodomy found in the teaching of the ancient 
Greek philosophers Plato or Aristotle. More recent thinkers, such as Immanuel 
Kant, have found homosexual sodomy no less unnatural . . . To find . . . the roots 
of modern conventional morality and law relative to the crime of sodomy, only a 
brief historical review is necessary. Sodomy was proscribed in the laws of the Old 
Testament (Leviticus 18:zt)  and in the writings of St. Paul (Romans 1:26, 27; I 
Corinthians 6:9 ,  10).15 
Bowers then provides a history of the moral tenor of sodomy laws, from the 
Romans through the Junkers. The Supreme Court opinion itself reads quite 
similarly, with Justice Burger basing most of his concurring opinion on the 
“millennia of moral teaching,” while Justice White, in his opinion for the ma- 
jority, analogizes the state’s regulation of homosexual with its regulation of 
adultery, incest and prostitution.s6 
VIII. 
MacKinnon appears to have a fairly straightforward explanation of the Post 
and Hardwick decisions. Of course the same arguments that would free a man 
who assaults a woman would convict a gay man, since the root of misogyny is 
heterosexuality. 
Women and men are divided by gender, made into the sexes as we know them, by 
the social requirements of its dominant form, heterosexuality, which institutionalizes 
male sexual dominance and female sexual submission. If this is true, sexuality is 
the linchpin of gender inequality?’ 
MacKinnon’s critique of the privacy doctrine that has undergirded recent pro- 
choice legal arguments is also relevant here. The same justification used to protect 
a woman’s right to choose an abortion, according to MacKinnon, is what gives 
54 Laurence H. Tribe, Brief for Respondent, Michael Hardwick (January 31, 1986), No. 85-140, 
.s5 Bowers, Brief, pp. 20-1. 
56 Bowers. 
57 Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, p. I I 3. 
p. 26. 
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a man the ‘right’ to rape his wife. What the liberal feminist lives by-the right 
to privacy-is also what she may die by-her husband’s right to privacy. 
MacKinnon’s thesis is that “the law sees and treats women the way men see and 
treat women.” She shows that, in the name of neutrality, the liberal state affirms 
male norms for everyone, a t  the expense of true equality. “Rape law assumes 
that consent to sex is as real for women as it is for men. Privacy law assumes 
that women in private have the same privacy men do.” But in the absence of 
social equality between the sexes, neutrality, consent, privacy, and speech are 
not one-size-fits-all items.58 Likewise it makes sense, according to MacKinnon, 
that the right to any form of apparently consensual heterosexual sex, upheld by 
the Oklahoma Appellate Court, would accompany a denial of homosexual rights. 
At the same time, MacKinnon is not able to help us reason through Stover, 
in which the man was found not guilty of rape, but was convicted of sodomy. 
MacKinnon would, no doubt, approve of the sodomy conviction-as noted 
earlier in the paper-because she is not interested in consent, only in women’s 
claims about experiencing harm. And yet the paternalism responsible for the 
man’s conviction for sodomy does not lead to representations of women as 
autonomous, and genuinely equal, which is presumably what MacKinnon is 
after. Rather, both the decision and MacKinnon elide the relevance of women’s 
desire(s). It is precisely this tendency of MacKinnon’s work, to efface women’s 
desire, that so many feminists find disturbing. Some note this in the context of 
MacKinnon’s assumption of women’s “false consciousness,” her belief in which 
is implied in her equation of “normal” intercourse with rape (since most women 
do not believe their experience of intercourse is like that of a rape). But that a 
radical theory may be at  odds with popular beliefs is nothing new, and really a 
methodological side issue in MacKinnon’s work. The real problem with Mac- 
Kinnon’s representation of women’s (sexual) desire is that it is a category non 
gratis. In MacKinnon’s world, only men have desire (for women). “What is 
sexual is what gives a man an e r e c t i ~ n . ” ~ ~  Women do not have desire, and 
lesbians do  not exist (since they are not part of the sexual reality of men). Thus 
MacKinnon’s critique of phallogocentrism remains strikingly phallogocentric. 
IX. 
MacKinnon’s refusal to represent lesbian desire is consistent with the Sedg- 
wickian economy, in which straight men are constituted through women and 
against homosexual men, in which, according to Judith Butler, “The relation of 
reciprocity established among men . . . is the condition of a radical nonreciprocity 
The preceding three sentences appear also in my “Penile Code,” Village Voice (January 16, 
1990), p. 61. The MacKinnon passages are from Toward a Feminist Theory ofthe State, pp. 161- 
2 and p. 169. 
5 9  Toward a Feminist Theory, p. 137. 
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between men and women, a relation as it were, of nonrelation among women.”60 
And yet for feminists to buy into that representation of the sexual economy is 
to turn away from our own reality. In fact there are relations among women, 
among lesbians, and between the two groups, which Sedgwick’s monolithic, 
elastic definition of “woman”-one that stretches from marching to fucking- 
does not represent. Jill Johnston, describing her experience of the infamous 1972 
Town Hall meeting in New York City, at which Norman Mailer took on the 
feminists, is instructive on this point. 
I had never seen Diana [Trilling] before and I supposed she despised me like the 
rest. I had met Uacqueline] Ceballos [of NOW] the week before at a talk gig in 
longisland [sic] at hofstra college and she seemed to have the same attitude as Betty 
Friedan who’d declared the year before over the mikes at the swimming bash that 
I was the biggest enemy of the movement . . . Possibly it was remarks like these 
that gave people the idea I was protesting the discrimination against lesbians. 
Possibly I was. Betty wasn’t nice to me at all. And she had said that the two 
movements (gay and feminist) had nothing to do with each other.61 
As I was writing this a disc jockey announced that “Martina Navratilova is a 
poor role model for women athletes because she is a lesbian, according to 
Margaret Court [the former record-holder for wins at Wimbledon] ,” someone 
Sedgwick presumably believes is “pursuing congruent and closely related 
activities”62 with Navratilova. (The response of the National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force was that “Winning nine titles at Wimbledon qualifies one as a role 
model. ”)63 So much for the feminist continuum. 
The problem with Sedgwick’s mistake is not that she fails to bestow a special 
title of oppression on lesbians, to give them their own claim to suffering analo- 
gous to that of women and gays who are victims of male homosocial exchange 
relations. While some lesbian political theories seek to give visibility to lesbians 
by showing that lesbians have been historically and are at present oppressed just 
like gays and just like women, it is lesbian desire, not lesbian oppression, that 
needs attention.64 That is, one reading of lesbian invisibility, of why “homosex- 
ual” means “gay man”, is that people do not think that there is sex when there 
is no penis.65 One response has been to dredge up instances of lesbian persecution, 
60 Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 41. 
6’ Lesbian Nation, p. 19. 
62 Between Men, p. 3 .  
64 This paragraph borrows heavily from Luce Irigaray’s and Helene Cixous’s essays in New French 
Feminisms, Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (eds) (New York: Schocken Books, 1980). At 
the same time, I want to beg the question of where what I am calling ”lesbian desire” comes from, 
whether its origin is biological, a defect of the patriarchy, or a matter of individual choice (none of 
which sounds right to me). Before it can be properly theorized, at least we need to note that lesbian 
desire exists in some kind of form that cannot be instrumentally traced from heterosexist practices. 
63 KIOO, FM, July 13, 1990. 
65 For one example of this critique cf. Gender Trouble, p. 49. 
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implying that if the state punishes lesbians for their sexuality, then indeed there 
must be a lesbian sexuality. In response to Foucault, MacKinnon and Sedgwick, 
one might point to one’s lesbian scars and say “me too.” But such an approach 
continues to represent sexuality with respect to the phallic model of homosocially 
constituted juridical oppression, rather than articulate the reality of a sexuality 
that is not so simply contained by the homosocial violences inflicted by men. 
This is not to deny that lesbians experience violence on account of their sexuality, 
merely to note that the male homosocial/homophobic model does not represent 
that violence. 
MacKinnon’s and Foucault’s silence on the subject of woman’s desire and, 
even more particularly, lesbian desire, is related to their hesitance to talk about 
sexual desire or people as subjects. There are no female subjects, only objects 
that are ruled, in MacKinnon’s state. And Foucault would reject efforts to discuss 
lesbian desire as participating in the will to truth. Indeed both the liberal state 
and psychoanalysis couch their claims to legitimacy in a language of truth, of 
objectivity and neutrality-norms which MacKinnon and Foucault believe dis- 
guise the actual instruments of power deployed at the center and margins of our 
society. Having correctly represented liberal neutrality and the psychoanalytic 
confession as instances of a will to truth that obscures questions of domination 
and subordination, MacKinnon and Foucault want to dislodge these discourses 
through an expose of who has power and who does not. Their efforts are flawed, 
however, analytically as well as strategically. It is a religious discourse of power, 
reactionary ideals about gender in the name of the omnipotence of God, that 
needs to be confronted by the unveiling of Nietzsche’s woman as truth-an 
action Nietzsche considers “indecent” and disrespectful. Similarly to Nietzsche, 
MacKinnon and Foucault both resist the possibility of representing any authentic 
desire of the female subject. But as we shall see below, this strategy is itself born 
of bad conscience and needs to be replaced by affirmative representations of 
female identity and desire. 
In the context of sexual politics in the United States, MacKinnon is too hasty 
in representing the liberal state as even formally neutral and Foucault is too 
quick to assume the regime-organizing authority of psychoanalysis. Just because 
Locke and Freud “happened” between Henry VIII and George Bush does not 
mean that the sixteenth century version of sodomy discourse has been entirely 
superseded. While the position of women is indeed similar to that of the prole- 
tariat Marx describes in “On the Jewish Question,” the same cannot be said for 
homosexuals.66 That is, while women are legally men’s equals, but exploited in 
66 For an excellent comparison of women’s political freedom with Marx’s idea of political eman- 
cipation, cf. Wendy Brown, “Reproductive Freedom and the Right to Privacy,” in Families, Politics 
and PubIic Policy, Irene Diamond (ed.) (New York and London: Longman Publisher, 1983). 
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civil society, homosexuals are formally oppressed, i.e., are specifically singled 
out as subject to arrest for engaging in sodomy.67 And since MacKinnon roots 
misogyny in the fact that homophobia is legally sanctioned, 
indeed mandated, means that MacKinnon’s entire theory of the state is in jeop- 
ardy when she writes as though gender inequalities are a function of the liberal 
state’s ostensible neutrality. Law in the United States is not yet indifferent to the 
distinction between homo- and heterosexuality, something to which neither Fou- 
cault nor MacKinnon attend in discussing sexual politics. Foucault emphasizes 
that the functions of sodomy laws now are clearly different from what they were 
400 years ago, but one does not have to believe in an unchanging continuity of 
representations to notice the prevalence of religious arguments informing the 
current condemnations of sodomy in the United States. 
11. SEX AND GOD IN THE UNITED STATES 
I. 
Foucault was writing in a country with a Socialist Prime Minister whose 
policies were not all that socialist, against the background of the Communist 
Party’s “defeat” in 1968 through its absorption into the state. In other words, 
Foucault was writing in a climate in which the Left had gained the form of 
institutional power without accomplishing genuine liberation. In France it makes 
sense to claim that the relevant discourses representing domination and subor- 
dination are not juridical and not religious (since religion is not at  all central to 
public debate in France), but medical. So Foucault concludes that those who 
want to challenge the power of the state should begin with the power of the 
medical community. “If one can succeed in modifying these relationships of 
power into which psychoanalysis enters, and rendering unacceptable the effects 
of power they propagate, this will render the functioning of the state apparatuses 
much more d i f f i c ~ l t . ” ~ ~  
France is not the United States, and it would be ahistorical (and also 
a-genealogical) to pretend that an explanation of sexual politics that holds for a 
country with 45 years of national health care, Communists in Parliament, and 
a state that mandates (and funds!) the distribution of an abortion pill (RU-486) 
would work just as well in a country that does not have a centralized health and 
welfare system, only recently allowed Communists legally to enter the country, 
and is on the verge of seeing abortion made illegal. In France there was May 
1968; here we had Kent State. That is, in France a significant sector of the state 
6’ Twelve of the 24 states with sodomy laws explicitly exclude heterosexual or married couples 
from their definitions of sodomy. 
69 PowerlKnowledge, p. 61. 
Feminism Unmodified, p. I I 3 .  
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technocrats joined “the people”-even if that led to diversion from the early 
radical aims of the movement-whereas in the United States the government’s 
reaction to social protest was to shoot its citizens. 
The discursive logic of Stover, Post, and Hardwick is not that of the scienti- 
zation of sexuality, nor is it that of the agnosticism of the liberal state. Rather, 
it is the crude dogma of Christian evangelicals, whose views are circulated 
through state institutions and the media, that provides the rationale and coher- 
ence of prohibitions on homosexual sodomy that accompany a laissez-faire 
attitude toward rape. The 1982 Congressional “Family Protection Act,” for 
instance-the political meat-and-potatoes the Moral Majority expected to be fed 
in exchange for their 1980 support of Ronald Reagan-included measures to 
cut off any funding to lawyers who worked on homosexual rights cases even 
when the federal funding was  not going to  that case. That proposed law also 
included a provision that would prevent federal legislation from superseding 
state laws that exempt husbands from being charged with raping their wives.’O 
Religion, particularly Christian evangelicalism, is a much more powerful cultural 
and political force in the United States than most of us atheists on the Left care 
to recognize, and sexuality is that discourse. Historian Martin E. Marty observes 
the following: 
First, contrary to expectations, religion is very much in evidence [in the United 
States], which means that the secular paradigm and prophecy that had dominated 
Western thought has come to be questioned. Second, rather than being contained 
within formal institutions, religion has unmistakably and increasingly diffused 
throughout the culture, and has assumed highly particular forms in the private lives 
of citizens. Third, traditional religion has not fallen away, as expected, but has 
survived and staged an impressive comeback, establishing itself firmly and endur- 
ingly in large subcultures.71 
What is true of the psychoanalytic discourse in France-its pervasiveness at the 
margins, its ability to shape state power-is true of religion in the United States. 
I find it rather bizarre that while the Louisiana state legislature’s 1990 vote 
against abortion rights took place literally in the midst of people swaying while 
clutching bibles, praying and clicking their rosary beads, an intellectually influ- 
ential assortment of post-modern thinkers across disciplines actually pretends 
that God is dead. 
’O Section 105 of S.1378, The Family Protection Act of 1981, “provides that no federal law, 
program, guideline, agency action, commission action, directive or grant shall be construed to pre- 
empt state statutory iaw relating to spousal abuse or domestic relations.” From rhe Congressional 
Record, Senate, v. 27, part 10, 97th U.S. Congress, 1st session, p. 12694. 
71 “Religion in America since Mid-century,” Daedulus, (Winter 1984), p. 149. 
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While Foucault and MacKinnon presumably inhabited the atheistic world of 
most academics, 5 5  per cent of Americans indicated to pollsters that religion is 
“very important” in their lives, and the rate of weekly church or synagogue- 
goers has been at a fairly constant 40-42 per cent since the 1950s (compared to 
about 5 per cent in F ran~e) . ’~  Other social science evidence confirms Tocqueville’s 
prescient nineteenth century comparison of the role of religion in the United 
States with its place in the emerging democracies in Europe. A multinational 
survey conducted in I 9 8 I asked people to “rate the importance of God in their 
lives on a ten-point scale.” In France, the average response was 4.72, while in 
the United States people gave God an 8.21, the highest of all the countries 
surveyed. (In fact, no other country’s citizens gave God more than 5.72-Great 
Britain, of course.) Furthermore, 
three times as many young people in the United States say they include religious 
activities in their typical weekend events than in Great Britain, West Germany, or 
France. In the United States, the number of Bibles purchased annually per capita is 
more than double that in Great Britain, nearly five times as high as in West Germany, 
and eleven times the number in France.’3 
Kristi Anderson complements the statistical evidence about the prevalence of 
religion in the United States with findings from intensive interviews with eight 
women who were referred to  her by regional leaders in Ohio’s Moral Majority. 
Not only is religion a vital component of the American way of life, but, specif- 
ically, it provides the justifications used by those active in “pro-famiiy” political 
movements. Anderson’s interviews 
allowed respondents to recount their own versions of the evolution of their political 
beliefs. These versions make it clear that underlying the ‘family’ schema, for them, 
is a reliance on absolute laws laid down by God.74 
The fact that psychoanalysis is the pre-eminent discourse in France, and that 
British liberal theorists argued for religious tolerance, does not mean that either 
psychoanalysis or liberal principles are central to the terms of sexual regulation 
in the United States. 
The discussion of sodomy cases in the United States has not “progressed” to 
the level of a Lockean tolerance of what happens in private-MacKinnon’s 
contention-much less to a Freudian psychoanalytic embrace of the sexual 
confession. Whereas France and England no longer have sodomy laws, many of 
the United States’ statutes still refer to sodomy as “the” Crime Against Nature- 
a 16th century phrase from Blackstone of which Foucault makes fun. Not Freud’s 
Three Essays on Sexuality, but Leviticus is what still matters to Justice Burger, 
72 Robert Wuthnow, The Struggle for America’s Soul: Evangelicals, Liberals, and Secularism 
73 ibid., p. 50. 
74 “Sources of Pro-Family Beliefs,” Political Psychology, (1988) ,  9 ,  (z), p. 241. 
(Michigan: William Erdmans Publishing Co., 1989), pp. 143, 47. 
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who, like the sheriff who arrested the rap group z Live Crew in Florida in 1990, 
seems to be more influenced by those who believe in an afterlife than those who 
care about an “inner life.” Extra-juridical diatribes against homosexuality are 
couched in the rhetoric of fire and brimstone. Reverend Jerry Falwell is on record 
saying that AIDS is God’s punishment of homosexuals. If we are to understand 
contemporary manifestations of homophobia in the United States it is not psy- 
choanalysis or medicine, but religious institutions that require investigation. 





In our time there isn’t one of the discourses on sexuality 
which isn’t, in one way or another, oriented in relation to 
that of psychoanalysis. 
Well, what I find amusing is that a declaration like that is 
only conceivable in the French context and the conjuncture 
of today. Don’t you agree? 
It’s true that there are countries where, owing to the way 
the cultural domain is institutionalised and functions, dis- 
courses on sex don’t perhaps have that position of subor- 
dination, derivation and fascination vis-a-vis psychoanalysis 
which they have here in France, where the intelligentsia, 
because of its place in the pyramidal hierarchy of recognized 
values, accords psychoanalysis a privileged value that no 
one can escape.75 
If in the United States the problem of gendedpower representations is constituted 
by religious discourses, the solution is not the subversion of the scientia sexualis 
or the overthrow of the liberal state. While Foucault and MacKinnon do not 
deny the existence of religious discourses, their work does not help us understand 
them as they currently circulate in the United States. 
111. 
Christianity has not been such a great thing for women or for homosexuals, 
but in different ways and for different reasons, depending on the particular 
historical context. How do we put together, then, the discursive supremacy of 
religion with the hardships politically active religious conservatives impose on 
women and homosexuals in the late 20th century United States?76 Clearly this 
is not the place for a thorough genealogy of the contemporary gendedpower 
Y Power/Knowledge, p. 109. 
76 According to Wuthnow, “religious conservatives” are far more politically active than religious 
liberals, Struggle, p. 54. 
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representations of the contemporary religious discourse, along the lines of Fou- 
cault’s work on scientia sexualis, or MacKinnon’s theory of the state. But perhaps 
it is possible to make some preliminary and tentative observations. 
According to Robert Wuthnow, a sociologist who studies modern religious 
organizations in the United States, the impetus for the religious conservative 
involvement in politics was resentment of a liberal judiciary. “The enemy,” he 
writes, “was the Supreme Court.”77 Beginning in the early 1970s the religious 
right reacted to the multiple blows they received at  the hands of the Supreme 
Court: Roe u. Wade  in 1973, alongside prohibitions of school prayer. Both 
decisions mobilized the sector of society most strongly identified with evangelical 
and fundamentalist faiths, what Wade Clark Roof identifies as the “upwardly 
mobile lower middle class.” He states that 
Mobilization of this sector represents a reactionary, traditionalist movement within 
the larger culture on the part of those who have much at  stake in preserving the 
old order. Ideologically, the class finds itself at  great odds with the more liberal, 
secular ‘knowledge’ classes, locked into a struggle over power and influence in the 
public realm. Appeal to the ‘old-time religion’ gives legitimacy to a way of life, and 
serves to integrate the religious and cultural identity so important to a large number 
of Americans today.’* 
It is this background that explains why in the midst of Reagan’s “shining city,” 
in 1987 when the rest of us were despairing over the Bowers decision and the 
state’s chipping away at  abortion rights, “Jerry Falwell asserted flatly that the 
Court’s liberal views had established unconstitutional rights ‘to kill the unborn, 
commit homosexual acts, repress religious freedoms, [and] exploit women and 
children through pornographic publi~ations.”’~9 It is clear from the above state- 
ment, and from the nature of recent governmental actions instigated by religious 
conservatives, that control of sexuality, more than anything else, is at  stake for 
Jerry Falwell and the millions of Americans moved by televangelists. There are 
a lot of moral issues the Christian evangelicals could pursue based on biblical 
injunctions. It is no less blasphemous to lie than to have homosexual sex, and 
in fact the Bible itself does not have much to say about sexuality per se. That 
issues around sexuality and the family seem to inspire the religious right more 
than numerous other topics raised in the Bible prompts one to want to know 
more about the specific power/knowledge discourses in contemporary Christian 
evangelicalism. Just as sexuality becomes science in Europe, and the two dis- 
courses are interwoven, so too the representations of religion in the United States 
77 Struggle, p. 55. 
78 “America’s Voluntary Establishment: Mainline Religion in Transition,” Daedalus, (Winter 
79 ibid., p. 56. 
1982), p. 180. 
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televangelist community are intrinsically bound up with its representations of 
sexuality. 
IV. 
Having named the power/knowledge discourse of religion as that which de- 
fines sexual politics in the United States, it may seem that the resolution to the 
apparent conflict between the narratives of “liberation” and oppression is at 
hand, since the religious discourse is so clearly one of the will to truth that we 
have the sophistication to reject, as opposed to the psychoanalytic discourse 
which Foucault asserts has a special insidious status (since it masks itself as 
progressive, as reasonable, as beyond the moralizing claims of religion in ways 
that are similar to the liberal discourse of equality). Foucault and MacKinnon 
imply that when the agents and logic of punishment are made explicit we will 
be less likely to tolerate, much less reinvent, the same oppressor. Whereas some 
of the arguments made by gay liberation organizations clearly refer to and 
support the authority of the medical community and liberal doctrines of privacy 
and tolerance, it is hard to imagine homosexuals using the Bible to justify 
anything, much less their sexual preferences. (It is clear, however, that what 
Foucault says about the tendency for “radical” sexual political actions to get 
absorbed into the dominant discourse holds for religion’s power/knowledge 
nexus. 2 Live Crew did not subvert Bible Belt morality, but strengthened it, by 
“proving” the truth of religious attacks on sexual pleasures, and functioning as 
a call to action for the religious right.) All this is to say that while the apparently 
progressive representations of the liberal state and psychoanalysis obscure their 
authoritarian complexion, it appears that religion is nothing if not open and 
straightforward about the need for authority. Thus perhaps we can dispatch with 
the political difficulties for sexual liberation in Foucault’s scientzu sexualis and 
MacKinnon’s neutral state by simply unveiling the religious will to truth in all 
its ancient decay, freeing ourselves to develop a more reasonable, i.e. 20th 
century, model of what counts as sexual agency and consent. 
Having exposed the tension between the norms that supposedly govern a 
modern, post-industrial society-at the very least, those of political liberalism 
and a belief in the legitimacy of the scientific/medical establishment-and those 
of the Christian right, perhaps there is sufficient discursive space cleared to 
reconcile Foucault’s desire to subvert gendedpower categories with MacKinnon’s 
ambitipn to displace gendedpower exploitation by articulating a feminist version 
of consent, so that it would be possible for everyone to have a recognized agency, 
make their own choices, and thus know when their decisions have been violated, 
by the state as well as by other individuals. What really seems to be at stake in 
all three sodomy cases discussed above is whether the participants desired what 
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happened. Obviously Foucault does not think rape is a good thing, just as 
MacKinnon would not oppose “truly” consensual sex for either men or women. 
So might not it be proper to reconcile the concerns of Foucault and MacKinnon 
by replacing the liberal story of consent with one more sensitive to the actual 
realities of current gendedpower relations? And yet such a formulation merely 
defers the question of an ethical-political language necessary to think about an 
alternative conception of consent. 
V. 
As Hanna Pitkin argues-in the context of the liberal social contract-it is 
not the logic of liberal models of consent per se, but the character of the 
government, the purpose of a particular political union, that determines whether 
an individual’s disobedience to the state is legitimate. After pointing out various 
inconsistencies that arise if one tries to deduce obligation to the sovereign from 
liberal (specifically Lockean) definitions of consent, Pitkin argues that in the guise 
of consent theory Locke really is elaborating, most appropriately, “what might 
be labelled either the doctrine of the ‘nature of the government’ or the doctrine 
of ‘hypothetical consent.”’ Pitkin continues: 
It  teaches that your obligation depends not on any actual act of consenting, past 
or present, by yourself or your fellow-citizens, but on the character of the govern- 
ment. If it is a good, just government doing what a government should, then you 
must obey it; if it is a tyrannical, unjust government trying to do what no govern- 
ment may, then you have no such obligation.80 
That is, the concept of consent in Locke derives from notions about what counts 
as a legitimate government, and not the other way around. As Pitkin puts it, 
“[Y]our obligation depends not on whether you have consented but on whether 
you ought to consent to it.’’81 Likewise, it is not consent itself, but the purpose, 
the character, perhaps we can even say the meaning, of a particular expression 
of sexuality that informs whether we regard it as legitimate or intolerable- 
interpretations of which are always open to debate even as we recognize that 
not all justifications will be equally persuasive. 
Each individual does and must ultimately decide for himself and is responsible for 
his decision; but he may make a wrong decision and thereby fail to perform his 
obligations. But then who is to say someone has made a wrong decision? Anyone 
can say, but not everyone who cares to say will judge correctly; he may be right or 
wrong.82 
“Obligation and Consent-11,’’ American Political Science Review, (January, 1966), p. 39. 
81 ibid. 
82 ibid., p. 52. 
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Similarly, the difference between consent as we currently recognize it and a 
“feminist theory of consent” can only emerge from, and thus depends on, what- 
ever story we tell about the nature of legitimate sexual encounters or relations. 
The obvious difficulty in bringing Pitkin’s work on the state to a discussion 
of the bedroom is that there is something either prurient or policing, or both, 
about presuming to have anything at  all to say about what happens in a realm 
of such personal intimacy. An uncloseted discussion of sex may ruin it, according 
to Foucault, at  least. (I  sometimes wonder whether that also explains Mac- 
Kinnon’s silence about lesbians who do not play butchlfemme roles-who do 
not fit MacKinnon’s description of those who play into the hand of heterosexism. 
The only lesbians who emerge in MacKinnon’s work are those MacKinnon 
describes as distorted by the patriarchy; MacKinnon does not discuss lesbian sex 
that is not somehow “perverted” by S/M, for instance. Her reluctance to talk 
about lesbian sex clearly is not a result of any prudishness, as her descriptions 
of heterosexual intercourse demonstrate. It is as if the only way to sustain the 
lesbian as the sole force outside of MacKinnon’s closed system of heterosexism 
and misogyny is for MacKinnon to keep lesbians out of her books.) 
VI. 
To the extent that we follow Foucault’s advice (and MacKinnon’s practice) 
and refuse to develop alternative representations of sex(ualities), we cave in to 
a special ressentiment Nietzsche does not acknowledge-in fact he praises such 
inclinations as noble-the backing away from the will to truth. 
And as for our future, one will hardly find us [artists] again on the paths of those 
Egyptian youths who endanger temples by night, embrace statues, and want by all 
means to unveil, uncover, and put into a bright light whatever is kept concealed 
for good reasons. No, this bad taste, this will to truth, to ‘truth at  any price,’ this 
youthful madness in the love of truth, have lost their charm for us: for that we are 
too experienced, too serious, too gay, too burned, too deep. We no longer believe 
that truth remains truth when the veils are withdrawn-we have lived enough not 
to believe this. Today we consider it a matter of decency not to wish to see 
everything naked, or to be present at everything, or to understand and ‘know’ 
everything. Tout comprendre-c’est tout mkpriser. 
“Is it true that God is present everywhere?” a little girl asked her mother; “I  
think that’s indecent”-a hint for philosophers! One should have more respect for 
the bashfulness with which nature has hidden behind riddles and iridescent uncer- 
tainties. Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons for not letting us see her 
reasons?83 
Nietzsche and Foucault support the veil in the name of sophistication, of depth, 
of good taste, while MacKinnon writes as though it would be nothing short of 
83 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Contra Wagner,” in The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking Press, 
1968), pp. 682-3. 
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a bizarre fantasy, at this point in history, to expose woman as anything other 
than a tawdry icon erected by and for men. What does it mean that the one 
occasion the post-modern gay man and feminist woman come together is to 
secure the woman’s veil? What is everyone so afraid of ?84 
In part we need to unveil the woman in order to provide something more 
than academic mumbo-jumbo to fight for. It is not the formal stability of the 
gender binary-the hierarchical principles of masculinity and femininity-that 
causes and endures pain. This is Seyla Benhabib’s position, at least. 
Carried to its logical consequences, poststructuralism leads to a theory without 
addressees, to a self without a center, and to the phantasmagoric play of signifiers 
and signifieds in the interstices of which power and society disappear as so many 
‘sites of discursive differunce.’ While Foucault celebrates the disappearance of man, 
feminists have just discovered woman. Are they ready to bid her farewell too? 
Derrida suggests, ‘Perhaps . . . “woman” is not a determinable identity. . . Perhaps 
woman-a non-identity, non-figure, a simulacrum-is distance’s very chasm, the 
out-distancing of distance, the interval’s cadence, distance itself.’ Are women ready 
to fight on the streets and in the legislatures for the needs and rights of a ‘non- 
identity,’ of a ‘chasm,’ of ‘distance’ itself ? Is not a feminist theory that allies itself 
with poststructuralism in danger of losing its very reason for being?85 
A poststructuralist feminist politics seems to entail eschewing personal identities, 
and simply fighting against that which seems wrong. For example, in her essay 
“Identity Politics and Sexual Freedom” (in Feminism and Foucault) Jana Sawicki 
states that 
We might even be prepared for the dissolution of feminism or lesbianism as we 
understand them in the future and thus not attach ourselves to our identities so 
rigidly. I am not suggesting that we can will them away, but rather that we might 
be more effective if we became less concerned with preserving them or imposing 
them on others and more concerned with eliminating injustices wherever they 
arise.86 
I can understand the analytic justifications for refusing identities such as “femi- 
nist” or “lesbian,” though I do not agree with all of them, but to argue that 
strategically it would be “more effective” to refuse them and organize to “elim- 
inate[e] injustices wherever they arise” is almost incomprehensible, especially 
when Sawicki later admits that her “practical pluralism is based on the implicit 
assumption that a power-free society is an abstraction and struggle an ubiquitous 
feature of hi~tory.”~’ Martin Luther King Jr had just such a faith in the possibility 
of a “power-free society.” King had a dream, and a good thing too because one 
84 I want to thank Michael Rogin for his provocative and helpful observations about this passage 
85 “On Contemporary Feminist Theory,” Dissent 36 (3), (Summer 1989), p. 369. 
86 Feminism and Foucault, Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby (eds), (Boston: Northeastern University 
Press, 1988), p. 188. 
87 ibid., p. 190. 
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hardly imagines half a million people assembling from across the country to hear 
him kvetch “If-it’s-not-one-thing-it’s-another.” 
As difficult as it is to see the face of the veiled woman, a fact that preserves 
a certain power in anonymity, it is equally difficult for her to be represented as 
controlling her own gaze, as being able to fix her desire on the rest of the world.88 
To the veiled woman, the world remains at a distance. She cannot see her enemy 
to refuse him, and she cannot desire herself. Thus her own oppression and self- 
affirmation remain murky. The simple refusal of the will to truth, the rejection 
of phallic desire, may undermine men’s colonization of women’s bodies, but it 
does not necessarily follow that the averted male gaze is itself empowering to 
the veiled woman. Following Irigaray, Spivak, in her critique of Derrida (and 
Levi-Strauss), counters the denial of woman as womb with the affirmation of 
woman as having her own sexuality. 
In legally defining woman as object of exchange, passage, or possession in terms of 
reproduction, it is not only the womb that is literally ‘appropriated’; it is the clitoris 
as the signifier of the sexed subject that is effaced. All historical and theoretical 
investigation into the definition of woman as legal object-in or out of marriage, 
or in the politico-economic passageway for property and legitimacy-would fall 
within the investigation of the varieties of the effacement of the clitoris.89 
Spivak wants to deconstruct the displaced phallus and render it an effaced clitoris, 
apparently pointing us to the possibility of the un-effaced clitoris, the possibility 
of woman as something other than a womb. 
VII. 
I am uncomfortable with the essentializing tendency of references to the 
clitoris, and therefore wish to restate the affirmation of non-phallic desire in a 
language of political identities, specifically a lesbian identity, since that is the 
persona that perhaps most fully captures the tensions between theories of “lib- 
eration” and theories of oppression. To put it in Foucauldian terms, the lesbian 
is, by virtue of her discursive invisibility, unsexed, unregulated, and neverthe- 
less-as one who bears the stigma of woman and homosexual-ppressed. 
Post-structural theorists, for instance Sawicki, distance themselves from such 
references (to a “lesbian”) on the grounds that ascriptive, essential identities can 
only be undercut by avoiding identity altogether, by substituting abstract de- 
mands to end injustice. Such a strategy is based on the mistaken assumption that 
there are either ascriptive, essentialist identities or no identities. And yet to 
pretend there are no identities is to live in a world without history, without 
people. Such a jump from people’s self-perceptions to the more scholarly-correct, 
88 Lisa Wedeen provided helpful information about the practice of purdah for this section. 
89 “Displacement,” p. 190. 
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post-modern vocabulary is not just politically misguided, but also inaccurate, as 
it hides the reality of complex political identities inscribed on the same individ- 
ual-identities rife with tensions and with concrete political possibilities. Indeed, 
denying what Hannah Arendt calls one’s “outlaw” identity may be as dangerous 
as the punishments inflicted on those who lack the right identity. 
Like the Jewish parvenu in Arendt’s essays “We Refugees” and “The Jew as 
Pariah,” gays and lesbians who conceal their identities pretend to an equality 
that does not exist.90 
If we should start telling the truth that we are nothing but Jews, it would mean 
that we expose ourselves to the fate of human beings who, unprotected by a specific 
law or political convention, are nothing but human beings. I can hardly imagine 
an attitude more dangerous, since we actually live in a world in which human 
beings as such have ceased to exist for quite a while; since society has discovered 
discrimination as the great social weapon by which one may kill men without 
bloodshed; since passports or birth certificates, and sometimes even income tax 
receipts, are no longer formal papers but matters of social d i~ t inc t ion .~~ 
Like the Jew in Germany, the homosexual in the United States is a legal identity 
that is subject to discriminatory treatment. Homosexuals are denied employment 
by various government agencies, and “homosexual” is also a category of aliens 
who are to be turned away from our borders. Income tax forms too discriminate 
against those who are in same-sex relationships. Thus, like the Jew, homosexuals 
can choose between passing and asserting their identities, between pretending 
that the categories that constrain their lives do not exist and taking responsi- 
bility-out of their recognition of their identity-for changing the oppressive 
nature of our political culture. 
According to Gayle Rubin, the lesbian has a special role in the political 
economy of sex, which we might say results in a special political identity. 
One last generality could be predicted as a consequence of the exchange of women 
under a system in which rights to women are held by men. What would happen if 
our hypothetical woman not only refused the man to whom she was promised, but 
asked for a woman instead? If a single refusal were disruptive, a double refusal 
would be insurrectionary. If each woman is promised to some man, neither has a 
right to dispose of herself. If two women managed to extricate themselves from the 
debt nexus, two other women would have to be found to replace them. As long as 
men have rights in women which women do not have in themselves, it would be 
sensible to expect that homosexuality in women would be subject to more suppres- 
sion than in men.92 
9O For a critique of the analogy between Jews and homosexuals see Eve Sedgwick, “The Episte- 
y1 “We Refugees,” in The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age (New 
92 “Traffic,” p. 1 8 3 .  
mology of the Closet, I,” Raritan, 7 (4). Spring 1988. 
York: Grove Press, 1978), p. 65. 
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The distinct nature of lesbian “suppression” is such that the lesbian can perhaps 
be said to have a different kind of freedom than the gay man. Yes, the lesbian 
experiences the burdens of misogyny and homophobia, but it is no good simply 
to add up layers of discrimination in order to arrive at the nature of a particular 
political identity, and it is possible to see emancipatory possibilities that result 
from the double “suppression” (perhaps to be distinguished from “oppression”). 
On the one hand, there is more political work to be undertaken to claim an 
identity. The cloak of lesbian invisibility is possibly even more intractable than 
the woman’s veil. Gays have a public identity, as do women, whereas the lesbian 
is notoriously absent from public discourse.93 Thus it seems that lesbians would 
have to create something from nothing to make an impression, to do what 
Arendt claims is impossible-to invent a self without a history. On the other 
hand, if we follow Arendt’s thoughts on the Jew as pariah, it is not the actual 
“content” of the identity of an oppressed people that determines the strength of 
their critical perspective. Certainly there are distinctively Jewish virtues associated 
with the Jew as pariah, but the Jew as “upstart,” the parvenu, also has distinc- 
tively Jewish  shortcoming^.^^ Thus it seems clear that there is nothing intrinsic 
to a particular outlaw identity that determines its political relevance and potency. 
Rather, it is the fact of a group’s political status, whether it is associated with 
the state or social outcasts, and then what the individual actor chooses to do 
with that political identity, that together determine whether one will be a parvenu 
or pariah. Arendt writes, 
Those few refugees who insist upon telling the truth, even to the point of ‘indecency,’ 
get in exchange for their unpopularity one priceless advantage: history is no longer 
a closed book to them and politics is no longer the privilege of Gentiles . . . Refugees 
driven from country to country represent the vanguard of their peoples-if they 
keep their identity.9s 
Similarly, the “indecency” of the lesbian is a criticism of prevalent sexual prac- 
tices that include the valorization of rape alongside the criminalization of hom- 
osexuality. To the extent that lesbians present themselves as lesbian, as opposed 
to woman, the reigning logic of what Rubin calls the “sex/gender system”96 is 
faced with a formidable challenge-“if they keep their identity.” And yet that is 
only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for a sexual politics. In the 
93 Although representing a silence has its limits, one recent example comes to mind. In a New 
York Times article on homophobia, Richard Isay, a psychiatrist at Cornell Medical College, was 
quoted as saying “seeing a feminine man evokes a tremendous amount of anxiety in many men; it 
triggers an awareness of their own feminine qualities, such as passivity or sensitivity, which they see 
as being a sign of weakness. Women, of course, don’t fear their femininity. That’s partly why men 
are more homophobic than women . . .” (July 10, 1990). Of course the only way the comparison 
between men and women makes sense is to imagine that the only homosexuals they are confronted 
with are male. 
94 “Jew as Pariah,” p. 66.  
91 ibid. 
96 “Traffic,” p. 159. 
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political economy of sex, identity is worth something-a lot even-but it is not 
destiny. 
VIII. 
A challenge to the prevailing sex/gender system depends on the assertion of 
sexual difference, on representations of sexual practices in their plurality so as 
to call into question the apparent normalcy and “naturalness” of the nuclear 
family. But to simply assert this as a complete politics is to assume as a means- 
the representation of non-heterosexist institutions and practices-what is in fact 
the end. To think that the production of such representations requires no more 
than accepting the invitation of various post-modern writers to make “gender 
trouble” with our identities is to believe that people stay in the closet out of a 
lack of imagination. If the failure to mount an effective challenge against hetero- 
sexist attitudes comes from something else, say, feeling that one’s life is at  risk 
for holding a lover’s hand anywhere outside the Castro district in San Francisco, 
then it is necessary to develop more analyses of the institutional sources of gay- 
bashing, for instance, as well as to consider already mobilized groups in resis- 
tance. In the United States, such an analysis would require an investigation of 
the ways in which power is deployed through representations of sexuality and 
the family in the discourses and other institutional practices of Christian evan- 
gelicals. Still, American sexual politics is not all Operation Rescue. There is also 
ACT-UP, and thus we need to reflect also on the reality of homosexuals already 
in resistance, providing explanations of our political successes as well as our 
failures. 
Foucault and MacKinnon ascribe too much and too little power to the insti- 
tutions responsible for the regulation of sexuality in the United States. In failing 
to recognize already established norms of progressive resistance at  the margins, 
which for some groups are born of an affirmative sense of community and 
identity, they blind us to the possibilities of working with the contradictions in 
our political culture, between the norms of the traditional nuclear family and 
the proliferation of alternative households, between the ideology of privacy and 
the fact of public controls of sexuality. Transforming prevailing oppressive in- 
stitutions is not simply a matter of undermining their legitimacy, as Foucault 
suggests, or developing totally new and different accounts of equality, as 
MacKinnon implies. Instead, we need to confront the repressive discourse of 
Christian evangelicalism with agendas drawn from current realities such as fe- 
male heads of households, homosexuals in public office, and lesbian and gay 
parents. Perhaps what needs to be theorized, then, is not the way that “libera- 
tion” binds us, but the paradoxical implications of what it means for persecution 
to free us. 
